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ABSTRACT 
Household formation, or the extent to which population is transferred into households, 
determines housing demand and reflects housing wellbeing. Young adults, who are new 
entrants to the housing market and sensitive to changing market conditions, have faced 
many challenges in China’s fledging housing market. This paper examines trends in 
household formation from 1982 to 2005 using census data. Then the 2005 One-Percent 
Population Survey data are used to study macro effects on the household formation 
patterns of the post 1970 generation (those aged 25-34 in 2005) throughout China.  
Household formation is measured using both headship and non-family headship rates.  
In contrast to those in industrialized countries, young adults in China become less likely 
to form independent households in time of rapid economic growth. When they do, they 
are more likely to form non-family households than before. Regional variations in 
household formation can be explained by several macro factors. Marriage rates are 
positively associated with headship rates, so is gender imbalance. There is a distinct 
pattern to the formation of non-family households, which reflects increasing mobility, 
labor migration, delayed marriage, and gender imbalance. Institutional and 
demographic forces, some of which are unique to China, are important factors in 
household formation. 
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Over the last thirty years, China's real GDP has grown at an average rate of 10% per year 
and average income has increased by about 10 times (World Bank, 2011). Rapidly rising 
income has led to a substantial growth in the housing sector especially after urban 
housing became commercialized in the late 1990s (Liu and Shen, 2005; Nie, 1999). 
Housing consumption has increased dramatically and private homeownership has 
soared (Yu, 2006).  
 
Not everyone has benefited from the housing boom. Housing has been used not only for 
residence in recent years, but also as an investment instrument especially in major cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai. This has led to a rapid rise in housing prices in select cities 
(Wu et al., 2011). While a growing number of people own multiple homes (Huang and 
Yi, 2011), declining housing affordability has forced many young adults to delay 
household formation, stay with their parents and roommates, and even congregate in 
crowded "ant tribes" on the urban fringe of major cities (Lian, 2009).  
 
Household formation is crucial for the overall health of the housing market, because it 
determines the amount of new housing required and connects population with housing 
demand. Household formation, measured by headship rates or the percent of 
population being householders, is also pertinent to the demand for public utilities, child 
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care facilities, consumer goods and land development (Smith, 1984; Burch, 1995; Pitkin 
and Masnick, 1987).  
 
Changing demographics has been a special force behind China's emerging housing 
market. The one child policy initiated in the 1970s and formally implemented in 1979 
has delayed marriages, abruptly reduced the birth rate, increased gender imbalance, 
and curtailed rapid population growth (Riley, 2004; Banister, 1987; Zhao and Chen, 
2008; Wang and Yang, 1996; Peng, 2011)1.  Coupled with internal migration and rapid 
urbanization, the number of non-family households has increased significantly, 
reflecting an erosion of traditional living arrangements in urban China (Goldstein, Guo, 
and Goldstein 1997; Cheung and Yeung 2015). All these demographic events have had 
significant effects on housing demand in China, but we know very little about these 
effects.  
 
The so called post 1970 generation (the P70G) is in the forefront of changing 
demographics. The P70G here refers to those who were born 1970-79 and aged 25-34 in 
2005. They are the tail end of China's first postwar babyboom. Similar to the post-war 
baby boomers in the US and Canada who dominate the demographic landscape, the 
 
1 Total fertility rate for China decreased from 6 children per woman in 1970 to slightly more than 2 
children per woman in 1980  (Poston, 2000; Banister, 1987). As a result of the one child policy, a typical 
woman also married and gave birth to her first child much later than before.  
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P70G2  is one of the largest generations in terms of population size, signifying their 
importance in the housing markets. 
 
The P70G is large in size and was in their prime age of household formation in 2005. 
They may have experienced significant demographic pressures in the markets (Yu, 2006; 
Lian, 2009).  The experience is perhaps similar to what the second half of the baby boom 
generation in the U.S. has been through (Myers, 2004; Myers et al., 2005; Berger, 1989; 
Easterlin et al., 1993). The large size of the preceding cohort may have crowded out of 
the younger cohort in the markets. Meanwhile, non-family living has been a particularly 
important issue for young adults as they become independent in life and enter the 
housing market for the first time (Waite, Glodscheider, Witsberger, 1986; Smith et al., 
1984; Mulder 2006). The rate of household formation they achieve as young adults will 
help determine the generation's future housing consumption (Myers, 1990; Jiang and 
Ren, 2005).  
 
Not only is the P70G one of the largest generations in China's history, it also has 
experienced the full force of economic reform. The P70G has much more freedom in the 
labor market and in their migration decisions than their predecessors. As a result, the 
 
2 Although each succeeding cohort has become progressively smaller which may eventually dampen 
China’s overall housing demand, the cohort currently entering China's housing market is still among the 
largest in history and critical to the health of the housing market. 
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P70G has seen a big increase in residential mobility, initiated the largest rural-urban 
migration in human history (Liang, 2001; Zhao and Chen, 2008), and started the 
phenomenon of  "floating population" (Shen and Huang, 2003; Goldstein et al., 1997). 
However, the Hukou status (the household registration system), which is unique to 
China, has crippled migrants, most of whom are from rural areas (Wu and Treiman, 
2004). Meanwhile, people of the P70G who have non-agricultural Hukou are no longer 
eligible for welfare housing and guaranteed jobs as some of their predecessors were. 
The P70G is also the witness of growing regional disparities in socioeconomic 
development, even though the central government has repeatedly attempted to reduce 
the disparities (Wei, 2002; Zhao and Tong, 2000; Chen et al., 2011).  
 
Although there is a rich literature on housing allocation and distribution at the 
household level and in selected urban areas (e.g., Huang, 2003b; Li, 2003; Jiang, 2006), 
little is known about how population is translated into households throughout China. 
The present paper uses census data to examine trends in household formation from 
1982 to 2005. Then, China’s 2005 One-Percent Population Survey data are used to study  
the household formation of the P70G at the city level, with a special attention to tastes, 
economics, demographics, institutional factors, and regional differences.   
 
In the following sections, we will first review housing reform in China and literature on 
household formation. We will then assess headship rate trends from 1982 to 2005. 
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Research questions and study approach are discussed in the following section.  We will 
report research findings and discuss relevant policy issues in the end.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Housing reform and its outcomes 
Urban China went through housing reform which started in the early 1980s and 
plateaued in the late 1990s (Wang and Murie, 1996; Tong and Hays, 1996). The main 
thrust of the reform was to abolish welfare-oriented housing system, establish market 
mechanisms in housing distribution, and accelerate housing production in urban areas 
through market privatization. As a result, private homeownership rates3 in Chinese 
cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing, jumped from 20% in 1994 to more than 60% in 2000 
(Yu, 2006). Housing has quickly become the largest household expenditure for almost all 
households (Song et al., 2004). 
 
Housing has also become a major form of investment in recent years, due in part to the 
lack of alternative investment instruments. Major cities such as Beijing has seen 30% to 
70% increase in price-to-rent ratios since the beginning of 2007 (Wu et al., 2011). 
Parallel to the rapid rise in housing prices, second home ownership has increased 
 
3 Since the state owns urban land and urban homeowners lease the land from the state, private 
homeownership in urban areas is not complete. In contrast, the vast majority of houses in rural areas are 
self-built and privately owned.    
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dramatically in recent years. A recent estimate shows that more than 15% urban 
households owned multiple homes4 in 2007 (Huang and Yi, 2011). Increases in second 
home ownership have affected housing supply and raised the barrier for new entrants 
to the housing market, making it more difficult for young people to form independent 
households and create new families.  
 
While urban housing has largely succeeded its goal of encouraging production and 
reducing government subsidy, there is evidence of increasing inequality in housing 
distribution. Occupation and education have become more important factors in housing 
allocation (Yu, 2006). Housing reform has reinforced inequality existed in the socialist 
system, giving favors to insiders and urbanites (Logan et al., 1998; Logan et al., 2010). 
Rural migrants have great difficulty in urban housing and labor markets (Chan and 
Zhang, 1999; Guo and Iredale, 2004; Wu, 2004).  
 
Whereas the urban housing sector has changed dramatically, rural housing distribution 
remains largely unchanged. Most houses in rural areas are still self-built and privately 
owned5. Even though per capita housing space has roughly doubled from 1985 to 2005, 
there are few renters outside major cities (Xie and Zhang, 2009). Rural housing market is 
 
4 Some of the second homes are used for vacations, while others are rented out for additional income. In 
the first case, un-occupied homes would be counted as vacant housing units in the census. In the latter 
case, they would be counted as rental units instead of owner-occupied. Census defines ownership based 
on the status of the residents in the housing units. If current residents rent the housing units, then they 
are considered as rental units. 
5 In contrast to urban land which is largely owned by the state and leased by urban homeowners, rural 
land is collectively owned.   
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almost nonexistent (Liu, 2006). Furthermore, multi-generation households are more 
prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas (Wang, 2006). Therefore, lower headship 
rates should be expected in areas of higher prevalence of rural population, where few 
individuals are expected to live in non-family households.    
 
Three sets of explanations 
The literature on household formation has been largely developed in industrialized 
countries in response to the remarkable changes in the number, size, and composition 
of households during the post-World War II period (e.g., Kobrin, 1973 ; Miron, 1988). 
The growth in the number of households had significantly outpaced population growth. 
The number of people per household had declined while headship rates increased 
correspondently. The growth rate of non-family households was even more rapid (Pitkin 
and Masnick, 1987).   
 
It is not surprising that these dramatic changes have garnered much attention from 
researchers who are concerned with such issues as housing, education, child welfare, 
and consumer behavior. The key issue is the determinants of household formation and 
why there has been such a significant increase in the number of independent 
households in general and non-family households in particular (e.g., Maisel, 1960; 
Ermisch, 1981; Smith et al., 1984; Miron, 1988; Carliner, 1975; Skaburskis, 1994; Haurin, 




Researchers have generally offered three sets of explanations for household formation, 
which are preferences/tastes, family structure/demographics, and economics (Burch 
and Matthews, 1987). The taste hypothesis presumes that there exists a relatively 
general taste for "privacy” or "independence." The preferences vary between different 
population groups, which lead to different headship rates (Pitkin and Masnick, 1987; 
Pampel, 1983). The demographic hypothesis indicates that population structure, e.g., 
marriage patterns and fertility, has become more conducive to  independent living after 
the World War II (Burch and Matthews, 1987; Kobrin, 1973). The economics hypothesis 
treats household status as a composite good. People have to make optimal grouping 
decisions based on the demand for market goods and labor market conditions (Ermisch, 
1981; Carliner, 1975). While researchers disagree about the relative importance of the 
three sets of explanations, they agree that these explanations are not mutually exclusive 
from each other (Burch, 1995). For young adults, the formation of non-family 
households is often considered an intermediate step toward the eventual formation of 
family households (Waite, Goldscheider and Witsberger, 1986; Mulder, 2006). In non-
family households, there is not a family nucleus and household members do not share 
family ties, i.e., excluding married couples with or without children and excluding single 
parents with children. However, due to gender imbalance and internal migration, a 
growing number of young people in China may have no choice but to stay with non-




While much energy has been devoted to industrialized countries where housing markets 
have matured, few studies have examined household formation in developing countries. 
Pasha and Lodhi (1994) report that income and education are of little influence on 
household formation in Pakistan. Rural-urban migration and women working outside 
households are the primary impetus for the formation of new households. Zhao and 
Chen (2008) show that political and economic changes have deeply affected household 
formation in China. Government policies, such as the Hukou system and the one child 
policy, have also had profound effects. Rural-urban migration has in recent decades 
changed the traditional notion of family life (Waite, Goldscheider and Witsberger, 
1986). Available evidence shows that developing countries can be very different from 
industrialized countries with respect to household formation.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What missing from the housing literature is an assessment of household formation 
across China. Building on the discussion above, three sets of questions will be addressed 
in this paper:  
1) To what extent have the headship rates of young adults changed from 1982 to 2005? 
How different age groups have fared over time?  
2) What is the relative importance of economic, demographic, and geographic factors in 
determining the headship patterns of the P70G at the city level?  
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3) To what extent are the findings consistent with previous studies which are largely 
conducted in industrialized countries? What are the implications for future housing 
demand in China? 
Data: To address these questions, the analysis will first use census data at the national 
level and then rely on the recently available Chinese 2005 One-Percent Population 
Survey microdata6. The dataset, which is collected by China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics, is arguably the most comprehensive and up-to-date data source in China, by 
which household formation throughout the country can be closely investigated.  
 
Study areas: This study will cover all cities (or prefectures) in China.  345 cities and 
prefectures can be individually identified in the 2005 data. These cities and prefectures, 
which will be called as “cities” in the following sections, include both urban and rural 
areas, covering all residents in mainland China. Demographic, economic, housing market 




The dependent variable: Household formation in this analysis is measured at the city 
level. The headship rate hhji for a given age group j in city i is defined as the number of 
 
6 The population survey relies on a two-stage sampling approach and covers the whole nation. 
Enumeration was taken between November 1 and 15, 2005. According to an official report from China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics, there is a 1.72% net undercount of the total population (Feng, 2006). 2005 
was also the first time that China's national population survey collects information on personal income—
an important factor in household formation. 
12 
 
householders/heads7  HHji in age group j per 100 people in the population POPj in the 
age group j as defined in the following equation:  
 
hhji = HHji/ POPji           
      
The higher the area's headship rate, the larger the number of households are formed by 
the P70G in the study city. hhji will be the dependent variable in the multivariate analysis 
subsequent to the presentation of descriptive findings. 
 
The multinomial model used in this analysis is specified as follows: 
hhji = GEOG + ECON + DEMOG + HOUSEM + INSITU  
 
GEOG =  geography (1. cities of four tiers; 2. seven major regions in China); 
ECON = economic factors (1. median annual personal income (25-34) by city; 2. 
income (25-34) differentials from city medians by city; 3. percent city 
population (25-34) not currently employed);  
DEMOG= demographic factors (1. percent city population (25-34) being men; 2. 
percent city population (25-34) currently married; 3. percent city 
population (25-34) with college education; 4. percent city population (25-
34) lived in another province 5 years ago);  
 
7 Household heads are called Huzhu in Chinese.  The term "household head" is used both in census 
counting and in Hukou registration.  
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HOUSEM= housing market characteristics (1. median housing cost of self-built 
housing by city; 2. median housing size by city; 3. percent housing units 
rented); 
INSITU= institutional factors (1. percent city population (25-34) away from the 
cities of their Hukou registration; 2. percent city population  (25-34) with 
agricultural Hukou).  
 
Ordinary linear squares (OLS) method is used in the multivariate analysis. After 
examining the determinants of headship rates by cities, we will use the same 
multivariate model to assess the determinants of non-family headship rates 8.  Non-
family headship rates refer to the percent of people (25-34) who are heads of non-
family households at the city level. As discussed in the previous section, there has been 
a large increase in non-family headship rates among young adults, even though their 
overall headship rates have decreased significantly over time.  
 
There are two different approaches regarding modeling household formation (Burch 
and Matthews 1987; Burch 1995). Economists have largely focused on individuals as the 
unit of analysis. Household formation is often regarded as an endogenous decision at 
 
8 Under the definition of National Bureau of Statistics of China, domestic households (jiatinghu) consist of 
people living under the same housing unit, whether related or not. In this study, a household that consists 
of only one person is regarded as a non-family household. Non-family households include both collective 
households (jitihu) and selected domestic households, each of which only has only one person or only 
unrelated individuals. About 4.7 percent of those aged 25-34 were in collective households (jitihu) in 2005 
and about 6.6 percent lived in domestic households that were also non-family households, almost none of 
them alone.    
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the individual level (e.g., Börsch-Supan, 1986; Ermisch 1999 ; Haurin, Hendershott, and 
Kim, 1993). The endogeneity issue makes it empirically difficult to study household 
formation in a large scale and generate statistically robust models, because researchers 
have to make “arbitrary assumptions about temporal and causal ordering (Burch 1995).” 
In the second approach, many national level studies have relied on data at am aggregate 
level (e.g., Smith 1984; Goldstein, Guo, and Goldstein, 1997; Monkkonen, 2013; 
Bongaarts, 2001). Ryder (1987) has forcefully advocated for macro-analysis because 
populations have "manifested in their aggregate behavior something more than the 
arithmetical summarization of assemblages of evidence about individuals." In this paper, 
we focus on the factors affecting household formation at the macro level in order to 
investigate the extent to which the headship patterns reflect the demographic makeup 
and the economic conditions of different regions.  
 
HEADSHIP RATE TRENDS 
Headship rate trends in industrialized countries are well documented in the literature. 
Headship rates have increased substantially in North American and most European 
countries after the Great Depression and especially during the post-World War II period 
(Miron, 1988; Keilman, 1988; Kuijsten, 1995; Schwarz, 1987; Maisel, 1960; Kobrin, 
1973). That is, as people live separately from their roommates and family members, 
more households9 are formed in a given population over time. In Canada and the U.S., 
 
9 Households are made up of family households and non-family households. In China, a growing number 
of domestic households (jiatinghu) have become non-family households.  
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headship rates among young adults aged 25 to 34 have increased to about 45%. That is 
to say, nearly half of all young adults are heads of their own households.  
 
While overall headship rates among young adults have been relatively stable in recent 
decades, non-family headship rates10  have increased rapidly (Smith et al., 1984; Borsch-
Supan, 1986; Haurin et al., 1993). Non-family headship rates for young adults are well 
above 10% (Smith, 1984; Masnick et al., 2010).  
 
Headship rate trends in China are somewhat distinct from those in industrialized 
countries. Even though both income and homeownership have increased dramatically in 
China over the past 30 years, headship rates have not increased to the same extent. In 
fact, some age groups have experienced unexpected declines in headship rates. (See 
Figure 1, headship rates in China by age, 1982-2005). The decline is particularly evident 
from 2000 to 2005, a period of rapid economic growth and growing rural-urban 
migration.  
  
    <Figure 1 about here > 
 
Overall headship rates in China increased from 33.1% in 1982 to 36% in 2005. However, 
young adults aged 25 to 34 have seen the largest decline of all age groups. Their 
 
10 Percent of people who are heads in non-family households (households in which the head is not the 
head of a family, i.e., single-person households or households of unrelated persons). In China, extremely 
few young adults live in single-person households.  
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headship rate decreased by 8 percentage points from 37.3% to 29.3% over the same 
period. As a comparison, their headship rate is well below that of their peers in the U.S. 
and Canada.  
 
There are also large regional differences in headship rates. Among young adults aged 25 
to 34, the average headship rate in tier 1 cities is 7 percentage points higher than that in 
tier 4 cities. Meanwhile, the rate in East China is 5 points higher than that in the Central 
region (see Table 1).    
 
    <Table 1 about here> 
 
While overall headship rates for young adults aged 25 to 34 have decreased from 1982 
to 2005, there has been a strong upward trend in non-family headship rates. In fact, 
their non-family headship rates have increased by more than 3 percentage points over 
the same period11. The increase in non-family headship rates mirrors the trend in many 
industrialized countries during the post World War II period, even though they are still 
far below those in the U.S. and Canada (Smith et al., 1984). (See Figure 2, non-family 
headship rates in China by age, 1982-2005).  
    
    <Figure 2 about here> 
 
11 In contrast, family headship rates for the age group have decreased by 11.3 percentage points from 




In summary, the headship trends in China are remarkable. Despite rapid economic 
growth and large increases in income, the headship rates of young adults have declined. 
Young adults in China are more likely to from their own households in a non-family 
setting rather than to be sub-members of family households. There has also been a 
large increase in the formation of non-family households, in light of the large scale of 
rural and urban migration and a substantial run up in housing construction and housing 
prices in major cities. The diverging trajectories of overall household formation and non-
family household formation deserve more scrutiny. So what are the determinants of 
household formation? 
 
EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD FORMATION PATTERNS 
The literature has identified several factors affecting household formation.  
Income and employment: The first and perhaps most widely held proposition is that 
household formation is directly linked to real income (Michael et al., 1980; Smith et al., 
1984). There is a cost associated with separate living or forming independent 
households. People will not be able to share public household goods with other 
household members when they live alone or in a small household. With growing 
income, people are more able to increase the rate of household formation. Both 
longitudinal and cross-sectional study at the individual level have confirmed the 
importance of income in the probability of people to form independent households 
(Haurin et al., 1997; Burch and Matthews, 1987; Hickman, 1974; Miron, 1988). Across all 
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age groups, income elasticity seems to be the largest among young adults (Smith et al., 
1984). This is not surprising given that most young adults are new entrants to the 
housing and labor markets.  
 
There are large variations in income and living standards among Chinese cities. When 
young adults make decisions whether to form independent households, they have to 
compete with other people in the same housing market and consider their income level 
in a relative term. Therefore, we hypothesize that the larger the income gap between 
young adults and the city median level, the lower the rates of headship among young 
adults.  
 
Low unemployment rates allow people to have stable income and help enhance the 
sense of security. Labor market behavior partially explains the differences in household 
formation between European countries (Blanco and Kluve, 2002; Mandic, 2008). Since 
social safety nets are still underdeveloped in China, unemployment may be a potent 
factor deterring household formation.  
 
Women's labor force participation gives more freedom to women outside traditional 
households (Pasha and Lodhi, 1994). It also provides a second income to increase the 
affordability of housing for married households, and facilitate household formation for 
female headed non-family households (Smith et al., 1984). However, unemployment 
rates are highly correlated with women labor force participation rates in China and labor 
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participation rates between the two genders are also highly correlated. In other words, 
cities with low unemployment rates also have high rates of women labor force 
participation. Therefore, the two variables cannot be included in the multivariate 
models at the same time. In this analysis, we will use unemployment rates as a proxy for 
women's labor force participation rates.  We hypothesize that cities with higher share of 
women working should have higher headship rates and higher non-family headship 
rates. Because the formation of non-family households is likely a result of increasing 
mobility and delayed marriage, income and employment should not be strongly 
associated with the formation of non-family households.  
 
Demographics: Demographics are linked to household formation (Pitkin and Masnick, 
1987; Pampel, 1983). The concept of life-cycle is central to the explanation of why 
households and families are formed and dissolved and the extent to which housing 
demand changes through life-cycle stages (Sweet, 1990).  
 
The transition into adulthood is a critical stage for household formation, when headship 
rates increase significantly. However, there are large differences between China and 
industrialized countries. In most European and North American countries, leaving the 
parent homes often signifies the transition to adulthood (Sobotka and Toulemon, 2009; 
Blanco and Kluve, 2002). Therefore, headship rates increase rapidly in early adulthood. 
On the other hand, the effect of marital status on headship rates is often ambivalent. 
Married couples are more likely to form independent households than the unmarried. 
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However, married partners form households jointly, which constrains their prospects for 
individual headship. Studies have shown that marriage rates are negatively, albeit 
weakly, associated with headship rates among young adults in the U.S. (Yu and Myers, 
2010; Kobrin, 1973). 
 
In contrast, adulthood in China often begins with marriage. For those who are not labor 
migrants, marriage is often the triggering event of leaving a parental home and 
establishing a separate living quarter (Hajnal, 1982). Young adults in China tend to leave 
their parental homes later and have significantly lower headship rates than their 
counterparts in industrialized countries (Yi et al., 1994). The trend has been reinforced 
in recent decades by China's population policy which advocates delayed marriage. Since 
marriage is central to adulthood transition in China and housing option is rather limited 
for premarital youth, marriage rates should be positively linked to headship rates at the 
city level. Meanwhile, marriage rates should be negatively associated with non-family 
headship rates. This is because, once married, most couples will form traditional family 
households.  
 
The marriage variable in this analysis is defined as the percent of young adults aged 25 
to 34 in each city that is currently married. The higher the percent, the larger share of 
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the study population in each area that is married. While cohabitation has increased in 
urban China, it is still very rare12. 
 
Another demographic factor which has not been tested in previous studies is gender 
imbalance. Due in part to the one child policy, gender imbalance is evident to a varying 
degree in Chinese cities. While gender imbalance makes it more difficult for young men 
to find spouses, the effect on headship rates is not obvious. On the one hand, men who 
could not find spouses may extend their stay with parents and delay household 
formation. Studies in Euroepan countries show that men are more like to stay in 
parental homes than women across Europe (Blanco and Kluve, 2002; Mandic, 2008). On 
the other, they could choose to leave parental homes before marriage and therefore 
increase headship rates. Among young adults, more men than women have migrated to 
cities and increased gender imbalance there. Migration tends to increase headship rates 
in destination cities. So the effect of gender imbalance on headship rates is not 
apparent. To measure gender imbalance, we use percent young adults aged 25 to 34 
who are men in each city. The higher the share away from 50%, the greater the gender 
imbalance.  
We also include percent young adults aged 25 to 34 who have college education and 
percent lived in another province five years ago to control for education and migration 
 
12 There is little legal protection for unmarried cohabitation in China.  In fact, unmarried cohabitation was 




respectively. Young adults with higher levels of education have greater earning capacity 
and higher permanent income, which are positive to household formation. Past 
research has shown that the educated are more likely to live independently and having 
higher mobility (Yu and Myers, 2010; Skaburskis, 1994; Michael et al., 1980). Migrants 
are found to have higher headship rates, because they have to split households (Zhao 
and Chen, 2008). Therefore, education and migration should be positively linked to both 
overall and non-family headship rates.  
 
Housing market conditions: In recent years, researchers have recognized the 
importance of housing prices and housing affordability in the decision of household 
formation (Ermisch, 1999; Borsch-Supan, 1986). Young people are particularly sensitive 
to housing prices in their decision to leave parental homes and live independently 
(Ermisch and Di Salvo, 1997; Haurin et al., 1993; Hughes, 2003; Smith et al., 1984). Rising 
housing prices and declining housing affordability have led to a slight decline in 
household formation over the last decade in the U.S., reversing a long time trend of 
rising headship rates (Yu and Myers, 2010). We expect that young people in cities of 
higher housing prices will have lower headship rates. The literature shows that the 
effect of housing prices on the formation of non-family household is not conclusive (Yu 
and Myers, 2010; Kuijsten, 1995). Since many cities have almost no commercial housing, 





Cities with larger housing size and more self-built housing13 should have lower headship 
rates because they tend to be more rural and less developed. The prevalence of self-
built housing is highly correlated with the relative size of the agricultural sector in each 
city. In addition, a larger space can accommodate more people and reduce the need to 
set up separate living quarters.  
 
Renting may be a more affordable option than homeownership for young adults to form 
independent households. With the rapid rise in homeownership, there is a lack of rental 
units in many cities. Therefore, we hypothesize that young adults will have higher 
headship rates in cities with a larger share of rental units. Non-family headship rates 
should also be higher, since most non-family households prefer rental housing.  
 
Institutional factors:  One factor not present in industrialized countries is Hukou or the 
household registration system, which has played a critical role in creating a hierarchy of 
urban places and favoring cities over the countryside (Cheng and Selden, 1994). The 
system has restricted mobility and limited the opportunities of rural migrants in cities 
(Alexander and Chan, 2004). Whereas there have been many attempts to reform the 
system and make it less restrictive, Hukou status remains an important determinant of 
housing consumptions and life opportunities (Huang, 2003a; Chan and Zhang, 1999; Guo 
and Iredale, 2004). The effect is particularly apparent for rural migrants, given that they 
have very limited opportunities for housing and public services in major cities.  
 




There are two aspects in the Hukou status which are relevant to household formation. 
One is that whether one has agricultural Hukou or non-agricultural Hukou. Almost all 
non-agricultural Hukou holders live in urban areas. Research shows that young urbanites 
are much more likely to leave parental homes in 2000 than those in rural areas  (Wang, 
2006).  Urbanization increases household formation since homes in cities tend to be 
small and cannot easily accommodate multiple generations. Urban residents tend to 
have lower fertility rates, which lead to smaller family size and higher headship rates 
(Schwarz, 1987; Zhao and Chen, 2008). A larger share of agricultural Hukou in a city 
reflects the agricultural status of the city, which tend to be associated with lower 
headship rates (Goldstein et al., 1997; Zhao and Chen, 2008). So cities with a larger 
share of young adults with agricultural Hukou are expected to have lower headship 
rates.  
 
Second, we can measure mobility by looking at whether an individual still stays in the 
household in which his/her Hukou was originally registered. Hukou is often linked to a 
specific housing unit or work unit. When individuals move away from the original 
households in which they were registered, they are supposed to move Hukou with 
them. However, moving Hukou is often a very cumbersome process and most people do 
not move their Hukou registration with them (Chan and Zhang, 1999). This phenomenon 
is often referred to as "Residence and Hukou Detachment" (Ren Hu Fen Li). The cases of 
residence and Hukou detachment have increased dramatically during the years of 
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economic liberalization. We expect to see that the higher the rates of the detachment, 
the higher the level of residential mobility in each city. Moreover, moving often results 
in a dispersal of family members making it more costly and difficult for family members 
to live in one household unit (Burch and Matthews, 1987; Rossi, 1955). Uncertainties 
associated with migration may also be conducive to sharing the households with non-
family members. Therefore, the share of the young adults who are detached from their 
original Hukou registration should be positively linked to both headship and non-family 
headship rates.  
 
Regional differences: Another line of explanation in the literature about household 
formation focuses on taste or preference for privacy. Researchers have argued that 
people have become more interested in privacy over time and would like to live 
separately from their parents and friends as economy improves. China should expect to 
see the same trend if not the same magnitude for the appreciation of privacy. 
Preference for privacy may help explain regional differences in household formation. 
Coastal cities and cities with large non-agricultural population should have higher 
headship rates. Young adults in these cities are also more exposed to industrialized 
countries and have similar lifestyles. Therefore, we expect young adults in tier 1 cities 
and in coastal cities have higher headship rates. In this analysis, cities will be grouped 
into four different tiers based on their housing market activities and economic output. 
In addition, cities will be separately grouped into seven contiguous regions according to 




There are growing disparities in income levels and housing prices among cities and 
regions. While tier1 cities14 have seen dramatic increases in housing prices after housing 
reform in the late 1990s, housing prices in tier 2 and 3 cities have been relatively stable 
(Wu et al., 2011). Although high prices of housing in tier 1 cities and costal areas are 
likely to dampen headship rates, people in these areas may be more exposed to urban 
lifesytles and have greater preferences for privacy and independent living.  
 
Table 2 reports the sumary statistics of the sample. It shows that young adults aged 25 
to 34 on average have a headship rate of 29.4%. In other words, 29.4% of the study 
group are heads of households. 5.2% are heads of non-family househeolds. The vast 
majority of the study group live outside the top three tier cities. East China has the 
largest population or 28.8% of the study population, while only 7.9% young adults live in 
the Northwest.  
 
The median annual income for young adults is RMB 6,622 or about USD$906 using the 
foreign currency exchange rate in 2005. On average, their income level is about RMB 
600 below the city median. About 13.6% of the study group are not currently employed. 
About 51% of the sample are men, while 86% are married. Only 11% of the sample have 
 
14 Tier 1 cities include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. 
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some kind of college education, while 6% lived in another province 5 years ago. On 
average, 77% of women aged 25 to 34 are working. The rate is 15 percent points lower 
than that of men.   
 
The vast majority of the housing stock is self-built, which is consistent with the fact that 
most people in China live outside urban areas. The median cost of self-built housing is 
RMB 17,316 or USD$2,139. The median housing size is 72 square meters.  70.4% have 
agricultural Hukou, while 14.2% are away from the original cities of their Hukou 
registration.  
 
The summary statistics shows that income levels vary greatly between cities and 
marriage rates are very high. More than 85% of the sample is currently married. 
Moreover, the vast majority of the study population still has agricultural Hukou, even 
though some of them are no longer engaged in agricultural activities. The high share of 
agricultural Hukou among young adults shows that it is difficult for rural migrants to 
obtain non-agricultural Hukou and become urbanites. Finally, residential mobility or the 
prevalence of residence and Hukou detachment varies greatly among cities. Young 





As mentioned briefly earlier, the empirical approach in this analysis is to estimate linear 
regression models to determine factors behind household formation patterns at the city 
level. In both models, we include several sets of control variables which are geography 
(models I, II, and III), economic factors (model IV), demographics (model V), housing 
market conditions (model VI), and institutional factors (model VII). In the end, we will 
include all these control variables in the full model (model VIII). Regression results are 
weighted by city population size.  
 
   <Table 3 about here> 
 
Model I shows that there are large differences in headship rates among the four tiers of 
cities. Even though tier 1 cities may have high housing prices, they have the highest 
headship rates. Tier 4 cities on average have headship rates 7 points lower than tier 1 
cities.  According to Model II, the East and the North have the highest headship rates. 
Both tier 1 cities and the East are relatively more developed. When we combine the two 
sets of geography together, regional differences only slightly moderate (See Model III).  
 
Model IV reveals that employment and personal income have a positive effect, while 
percent not employed and income gap are negatively linked to headship. These results 




Model V indicates that gender imbalance, marriage rates, education, and migration are 
all positively associated with headship rates. Evidently, 1 percent point increase in 
percent men and percent married at the city level will lead to 1 and 0.44 percent point 
increase in headship rates among young adults respectively.  
 
Model VI reports that housing cost and housing size are negatively linked to household 
formation, while the availability of rental units has a positive effect.  
 
Model VII shows that residence and Hukou detachment is strongly associated with 
household formation, while agricultural Hukou is not statistically significant.  
 
Model VIII is the full model, including all the factors discussed above as independent 
variables. While several independent variables are no longer statistically significant, the 
high value of adjusted R-squared indicates the strong predicting power of the full model. 
In other words, about 70% of the variance in the dependent variable can be predicted 
by the independent variables.  
 
The results largely mirror those in previous models, with some notable exceptions. First, 
after controlling for other variables, regional differences in headship rates have largely 
disappeared. Cities in the North and Northeast have slightly lower headship rates. This 
finding only provides limited support for the taste hypothesis. Second, employment, 
education, and migration are no longer statistically significant in the full model. Perhaps, 
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educated young adults are largely concentrated in tier 1 cities and in the East. Migration 
is also more prevalent in those areas, so is gender imbalance. When included in the full 
model, these factors may have counteracted with each other. Meanwhile, income, 
income gap, gender imbalance, marriage rates, housing market variables are all 
statistically significant. Results support for the economic and demographic hypotheses 
in explaining headship differences across cities.  Surprisingly, the institutional factors are 
no longer statistically significant in the full model. Perhaps, the Hukou status is reflected 
in income, income gap, and educational attainment. When all factors are included in the 
full model, the role of the Hukou status is no longer apparent. Perhaps, institutional 
barriers have become less important for household formation.   
 
   <Table 4 about here> 
 
As discussed before, the rate of non-family household formation has increased from 
1998 to 2005 despite the decrease in overall headship rates among young adults. That is 
to say, fewer young people form independent households, and, when they do, they are 
much more likely to be in non-family households. Table 4 presents the estimates for 
macro effects on non-family headship rates at the city level.  
 
What are the major findings? First, large regional differences have nearly disappeared in 
the full model. Second, there are regional differences in non-family headship rates. The 
East and the South have the highest rates, while the North—a relatively less developed 
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region in China—has lower rates. Again, the result shows a limited support for the taste 
hypothesis. Third, income, income gap, and employment are no longer statistically 
significant in the full model, revealing that economic factors are perhaps less important 
in the formation of non-family households. Forth, not surprisingly, marriage rates are 
negatively associated with non-family household formation, while the relative 
importance is lessened in the full model. Fifth, education and migration remain 
relatively strong predictors of non-family headship rates. Young adults are more likely to 
form non-family households in place where they are educated and mobile. Sixth, 
median housing size, housing cost, and the availability of rental units are not statistically 
significant in the full model, suggesting that young adults in non-family households may 
be in a transitional stage. Where there are more rental units, they are more likely to 
form non-family households. Finally, residence and Hukou detachment, another 
indicator of mobility, is positively associated with non-family headship rates, while 
percent agricultural Hukou is not significant.  
 
In summary, regional differences in headship rates and non-family headship rates can 
be largely explained by the macro factors in the full models. Economic factors and 
housing market conditions affect household formation, but not non-family household 
formation. Demographics are a strong predictor. Institutional factors perhaps correlated 
with other control variables in the full model are also important determinants. The high 





Employment is not significant in the full models. As discussed in previous section, 
women labor force participation is highly correlated with the employment rate by cities. 
The result is very different from that of Pakistan in which women labor force 





Household formation among young adults reflects their housing wellbeing and 
determines future housing demand. As China improves its economy, there has been a 
growing demand for housing. However, economic prosperity has not benefited 
everyone. Young adults or the post 1970 generation have faced many challenges in their 
path to forming independent households. The headship rates have declined among 
young adults in recent years. If the trend persists, the P70G will not only have lower 
housing attainment than their predecessors but also keep the deficit into the future. In 
contrast, non-family headship is rising, which is a result of delayed marriage and 
increased mobility among young adults. As China becomes more urbanized and less 
restrictive on migration, the trend of rising non-family household formation is likely to 




In this paper, we look at trends in household formation over time and examine the 
macro effects on household formation at the city level.  While the cross-sectional 
analysis does not provide a view of the effect of temporal changes on declining headship 
rates among young adults, five conclusions are suggested by the analysis.  
 
First, geographic differences in household formation are significant, but they can be 
largely explained by the differences in housing market conditions, socioeconomic 
factors and demographics. Despite high housing prices, coastal cities and tier 1 cities still 
have the highest headship rates. If the geographic differences are a proxy for cultural 
preferences or tastes, results here only provide weak support for this hypothesis.    
 
Second, economic factors and housing market conditions are important household 
formation in China. This should not be a surprise given that the market economy in 
China is gradually maturing. Rising housing cost and increasing income gap may be 
responsible for the decline in the headship rates among young adults. Results here 
provide moderate support for the economics hypothesis.  
 
Third, perhaps the most interesting findings are about the role of demographics and 
institutional factors. Gender imbalance is strongly associated with both overall and non-
family headship rates. Unlike young men in Europe who are more likely to stay with 
parents than young women, many “surplus” young men in China are leaving their 
families and staying in non-family households. Those who live in collective households 
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are most likely labor migrants to cities. Furthermore, young adults who have high levels 
of education and who moved across provinces are the primary candidates for non-
family households.  
 
Fourth, marriage rates have a strong and positive link to household formation, but a 
weak and negative association with non-family household formation. This result is 
different from the literature based in industrialized countries. Marriages remain an 
important milestone for the transition into adulthood in China. While it is difficult to 
ascertain the causal relationship between marriage and household formation, results 
here provide strong support for the demographic explanation of household formation in 
China. 
 
Fifth, Hukou is still an important determinant of household formation. Residential 
mobility encourages household formation. Consistent with the literature, migration is 
positively linked to household formation. Young adults in rural areas are more likely to 
stay with their families than to be independent.  
 
If the policy priority is to support household formation among young adults, the 
government needs to help young adults increase income and to relax its population 
policy that discourages early marriages. Another way is to increase the supply of 
affordable rental housing by regularizing the rental sector in cities and facilitating home 
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owners to rent out their homes. Meanwhile, the government needs to prepare for the 
steady growth in the number of non-family households in cities.  
 
Future research ought to examine household formation through a longitudinal 
framework and explain why headship rates among young adults have declined from 
2000 to 2005, which coincided with a period of rapid economic growth in China. When 
feasible, future research should also study household formation at the individual level 
and look at the extent to which the results are different. Finally, future research should 
examine the role of speculative behavior in China’s emerging housing market and the 
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Figure 1. Headship rates by age groups in China, 
1982-2005
Figure 2. Non-family headship rates by age 





























# obs Headship Rates Nonfamily 
Headship Rates
Ratio of Non-family to Overall 
Headship Rates
Tier 1 cities 6 35.6 14.5 40.8
Tier 2 cities 19 30.9 7.9 25.6
Tier 3 cities 23 29.3 6.7 22.9
Tier 4 cities 297 28.6 3.8 13.3
Total 345
East 80 30.7 6.0 19.4
South 38 27.9 9.8 35.2
Central 45 26.0 3.2 12.3
North 38 31.3 4.4 14.2
Northwest 52 28.3 3.7 13.0
Southwest 56 30.1 4.2 13.9
Northeast 36 29.7 3.7 12.4
Total 345
Note: results are weighted by  city population size.
Table 1.  Headship and nonfamily headship rates for adults aged 25 to 34 by 
geography, 2005
Table 2. Summary statistics for adults aged 25 to 34, 2005
# Obs. 345
Mean Std. Dev.
Headship rate (percent people who are household heads) 29.3 5.3
Non-family headship rate  (percent people who are 
household heads in nonfamily households) 5.2 4.3
Ratio of Non-family to Overall Headship Rates 17.0 11.6
Geography
Tier 1 cities 6.8 25.3
Tier 2 cities 9.8 29.8
Tier 3 cities 8.8 28.4











Annual personal income (in 1,000 RMB) 6.6 3.6
Income differences  from city median (in 1,000 RMB) 0.6 0.8
Percent not employed (25-34) 13.6 5.9
Demographic factors
Percent men (25-34) 51.1 2.8
Percent married (25-34) 85.8 6.1
Percent with college education (25-34) 10.8 6.8
Percent lived in another province 5 yrs. ago (25-34) 6.4 10.3
Housing characteristics
Housing cost of self-built housing (RMB logged) 9.6 0.6
Housing size (square meters logged) 4.3 0.2
Percent rental units 10.6 10.9
Institutional factors
Percent away from city of Hukou  registration 22.4 18.8
Percent having agricultural Hukou 70.4 13.7
Note: results are weighted by  the size of city population.
Table 3. Regression results for the determinants of headship rates for adults aged 25 to 34, 2005
Adj R-squared 0.120 0.093 0.214 0.210 0.461 0.429 0.199 0.705
Intercept 35.614 *** 30.659 *** 36.876 *** 27.059 *** -59.051 *** 96.961 *** 26.060 *** 32.717 **
Tier 1 cities (Reference)
Tier 2 cities -4.681 ** -5.141 ** -0.826  
Tier 3 cities -6.278 *** -6.493 ** -1.303  
Tier 4 cities -7.050 *** -6.969 *** -1.023  
East (Reference)
South -2.753 ** -3.448 * -0.139  
Central -4.633 *** -4.084 *** -1.028  
North 0.619  0.166  -2.009 *
Northwest -2.379 * -1.708  -1.151  
Southwest -0.519  -0.387  0.762  
Northeast -0.936  -0.427  -2.560 **
Annual personal income (in 1,000 RMB) (25-34) 0.782 *** 0.749 ***
Income (25-34) differences from city median  (in 1,000 RMB) -1.709 *** -1.204 **
Percent not employed  (25-34) -0.138 * -0.085  
Percent men (25-34) 0.972 *** 0.681 ***
Percent married (25-34) 0.441 *** 0.464 ***
Percent with college education (25-34) 0.224 *** 0.107  
Percent lived in another province 5 yrs. ago (25-34) 0.199 *** -0.018  
Cost of self-built housing (RMB logged) -4.960 *** -4.896 ***
Housing size (square meters logged) -5.478 ** -7.718 ***
Percent rental units 0.338 *** 0.165 *
Percent away from place of Hukou  registration (25-34) 0.128 *** 0.000  
Percent with agricultural Hukou (25-34) 0.006  -0.001  
Note: results are weighted by  city population size.
* p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 Two-tailed tests
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Table 4. Regression results for the determinants of nonfamily headship rates for adults aged 25 to 34, 2005
Adj R-squared 0.443 0.204 0.567 0.713 0.899 0.845 0.881 0.926
Intercept 14.529 *** 5.954 *** 14.094 *** 0.465  0.711  -1.885  -1.174  -5.640  
Tier 1 cities (Reference)
Tier 2 cities -6.608 ** -5.449 ** 0.170  
Tier 3 cities -7.806 ** -7.306 *** 0.265  
Tier 4 cities -10.711 *** -9.638 *** 0.217  
East (Reference)
South 3.873 *** 3.124 * 0.844 *
Central -2.754 *** -1.720 *** -0.174  
North -1.517 * -1.868 ** -1.013 **
Northwest -2.283 ** -1.184 ** 0.035  
Southwest -1.778 ** -1.452 * 0.481  
Northeast -2.266 ** -1.435 ** -0.565  
Annual personal income (in 1,000 RMB) (25-34) 1.157 *** 0.022  
Income (25-34) differences from city median  (in 1,000 RMB) -1.199 ** 0.045  
Percent not employed  (25-34) -0.162 *** -0.028  
Percent men (25-34) 0.198 *** 0.182 ***
Percent married (25-34) -0.080 *** -0.012 *
Percent with college education (25-34) 0.108 *** 0.085 *
Percent lived in another province 5 yrs. ago  (25-34) 0.316 *** 0.122 **
Housing cost of self-built housing (RMB logged) 0.347  -0.065  
Housing size (square meters logged) 0.008  -0.235  
Percent rental units 0.352 *** 0.053 *
Percent away from place of Hukou  registration (25-34) 0.222 *** 0.092 ***
Percent with agricultural Hukou (25-34) 0.020 ** 0.007  
Note: results are weighted by  city population size.
* p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 Two-tailed tests
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